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The politics of literacy policy in the context of large scale education reform.   
 




In this paper I will consider the lessons that can be learnt about literacy policy and its role in large scale 
education reform programmes, with particular reference to policy-making in England since the election 
of New Labour in 1997.  New Labour‟s promise to the electorate in 1997 was that state–funded 
education could be fixed and turned into a high quality delivery system from which all would benefit.  
It could be fixed by direct intervention from politicians committed to overhauling the public sector and 
applying new principles which would see standards rise.  So confident were politicians that a 
measurable rise in standards would follow that David Blunkett, when appointed Secretary of State for 
Education in New Labour‟s first term, promised that he would resign if 80% of children taking the 
standard attainment tests in literacy at age 11 did not gain Level 4 within the next 5 years. (In 1996, the 
percentage achieving Level 4 in reading was 57 %.  In fact David Blunkett switched posts in 
government before the allotted time was up.)  The National Literacy Strategy was the main vehicle for 
change, whilst the target for achievement in literacy became one of the most public and obvious 
measures of the government‟s success in reforming education.    
 
Over the decade that followed New Labour‟s election, early optimism about what government could 
achieve has been tempered by the twists and turn of events, which saw the education performance data 
plateau just short of the government‟s targets, and the National Literacy Strategy morph into the 
Primary National Strategy as it gradually moved from the centre of the political action to a more 
peripheral position.  Within government itself the National Literacy Strategy‟s progress has acted as an 
important catalyst for reflection on what works in public sector reform more generally and the 
challenges those running such programmes face.  Some of those most deeply involved in this enterprise 
are now applying those lessons elsewhere (Dillon, 2007).  This paper takes as its central points of 
analysis the evolution of literacy policy within the policy cycle which has seen New Labour alter its 
own thinking on how to achieve success in managing education reform.  The paper reflects on the array 
of actors within government and beyond who have been involved in trying to make that policy work, or 
who may have acted as (dis)interested bystanders commenting from the sidelines.  What are the lessons 
that can be learnt which might contribute to the development of literacy policy elsewhere? 
 
Introduction. 
Over the last decade or so education reform has become commonplace – it is part and 
parcel of what governments do.  If they are not doing it themselves they worry about 
whether they should   (OECD, 2008).  Different national contexts present different 
opportunities to put reform into place and shape its details (Jones et al, 2008).  There 
is no single recipe that governments follow, even if the discourses that act as a spur to 
reform are voiced in very similar terms.  If the underlying grammar is constructed 
through talk of finance reform, governance reform, teacher reform, curriculum reform 
or even equity reform, as the World Bank lists them, 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/education/globaleducationreform/10.EquityReform/equit
y%20ref.htm), then these common elements do not lead to a single response.  In many 
respects governments seem to learn how to do reform by taking the plunge themselves 
and committing to the act.  This process has enabled those most directly engaged to 
draw lessons about the relative success or failure of what has been attempted 
(Hopkins, 2004; Levin, 2003; Luke, 2005; Stannard and Huxford, 2007; Barber, 
2007).   For others more directly involved in implementing policy at classroom level, 
there is often much less space to reflect, let alone influence the next turn of events.  
Teachers and pupils may have very little control over the reform process even as 
electorates may offer only an indirect mandate to politicians for taking one form of 
action over another.  The distance this creates within and between communities of 
practice has generated new forms of exchange in policy ideas in which consultants 
move from one venue to another offering new lines of approach to governments that 
can be taken up in different ways (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004).  This transfer of ideas may 
step ahead of or around the kinds of checks and balances that have conventionally 
operated in the academy and which have historically controlled how research 
evidence is collected and weighed and how the outcomes of particular interventions 
are assessed, evaluated and then disseminated as part of knowledge-building (Oakley, 
2000;  Moss and Huxford, 2007).  Policy-driven education reform is indeed creating 
new kinds of applied knowledge geared to different stakeholders and the different 
kinds of risks they run (Gibbons et al, 1994).  
 
To explore some of these issues, this paper will consider the National Literacy 
Strategy (NLS) and its evolution as a programme of reform for English primary 
schools over the length of the policy cycle.  The paper will consider how NLS has 
contributed to ideas about how to manage change in the public sector and the 
repercussions this has had for the exchange of policy ideas elsewhere.   
 
Methods 
The paper draws on research conducted over a number of years with funding from the 
ESRC.  An initial project focused on classroom level implementation of the National 
Literacy Strategy and collected data in two different local authorities, and four 
primary school classrooms
 i
.  Alongside classroom observation, the data consisted of 
interviews with different policy actors, including those charged with implementing 
the NLS at local level, classroom teachers and teaching assistants and children in the 
classrooms observed.  These data are not the primary focus for this paper. A second 
project focused on the evolution of literacy policy between 1996-2004 and collected 
interviews with a range of actors involved in steering literacy policy from different 
vantage points
ii
.  Many interviewees were operating within government agencies 
acting at arms length from government itself, each with their own distinct remit and 
responsibilities.  Both projects collected a range of policy documents that instantiated 
key developments in the National Literacy Strategy, using interviews with 
practitioners and policy-makers to steer that selection.  The second project also 
collected documents which captured the discursive development of the policy in the 
wider political sphere, including media coverage of key events, and reports on the 
reform process produced for and within government.  Finally the second project also 
interviewed a range of academics who had either actively participated in the policy 
process, or had engaged with it in other ways, some from a supportive, others from a 
critical perspective.   The interviews were supplemented by a survey of members of 
relevant learned societies.  (Final reports of both projects are available on the ESRC 
website.)   For the purposes of this paper analysis focuses on the evolution of policy at 
the centre as it was perceived by those most directly involved and in relation to the 
broader policy cycle of which it formed part. 
 
 
Policy as a vehicle for knowledge transfer 
One of the dominant conceptions underpinning the current round of public sector 
reform is that policy can and should act as a mechanism for transferring appropriate 
knowledge from one place to another.  Sometimes known as the rational/ linear 
model, the assumption is that the act of transferring the right knowledge to the right 
place will change what people do and thereby ensure different outcomes (Taylor et al, 
1997).  From a policy-making perspective, the main focus rests with which policy 
content should be chosen and how it can be delivered in a manner that ensures it is 
“correctly” used.   Audit and accountability tools play their part in achieving this end 
(Earl et al, 2003).  Depending on the precise programme of reform, politicians may 
take direct responsibility for choosing the policy content (as in England); they may 
sub-contract this responsibility to those they directly appoint to make the selection for 
them (as in various states in Australia and Canada);  or they may employ a series of 
policy levers to guide, enforce, incentivise as well as restrict the choices of knowledge 
content they expect others to make (as at federal level in the USA, or, with a much 
less punitive set of policy tools, in Scotland).   
 
Politicians‟ choices are most often justified by appeals to “what works”.  In the UK, 
New Labour politicians used this phrase quite specifically to contrast their own 
decisions with others‟ reliance on ideology or dogma.   
 
“This Government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not by 
dogma but by an open-minded approach to understanding what works and why. 
This is central to our agenda for modernising government: using information 
and knowledge much more effectively and creatively at the heart of policy-
making and policy delivery.”  Blunkett, 2002 quoted in Wells (2007) 
 
Staking out the territory in this way helps establish a contrast between the kinds of 
choices this generation of politicians will make and those that have gone before.  It 
also contrasts the ideology-free criteria upon which governments will act with the 
(self) interests of professional groups whose allegiances to particular methods or 
founding principles could be cast as too factional, too narrow and also unreliable.  The 
failures of such groups can be amply demonstrated by the (inadequate) performance 
outcomes from the education system.  In England at least this kind of discursive re-
positioning has been very important in creating room for government to act. 
 
What works for politicians is cast as a pragmatic choice.  It is whatever will transform 
practice by being taken from here to there.  The guarantee lies with what happens 
next, and in particular with the impact on performance data once such a transfer of 
knowledge has taken place.  Within the academy questions about what works look 
rather different.   They depend upon fine judgements about the depth of evidence that 
can support one view rather than another even as the criteria used to make such 
assessments will vary according to different foundational research traditions. 
Questions about what works lead into questions about why. Rather than acting as 
distractions from the main task of solving immediate practical dilemmas, this actually 
plays a fundamental part in knowledge building.  For instance, Connelly et al (2009) 
compared the skills and competencies of children taught in Scotland using a phonics 
first approach with children taught in New Zealand using a non-phonics text-based 
approach. Using a common set of testing procedures which tried to capture a range of 
skills appropriate to each method on a sample matched for their reading level, they 
were able to demonstrate that children took different routes towards becoming skilled 
readers depending on the method to which they were exposed.  Yet would such 
differences wash out or persist in shaping later fluency?  In line with research 
evidence collected elsewhere, those exposed to phonics first certainly acquired 
decoding skills more swiftly and were faster at deciphering non-words, but those 
exposed to the text-based approach demonstrated faster reading of whole texts 
without sacrificing accurate comprehension.  Why should this be so?  By exploring 
these differences, this research is helping theorise how children really learn to read 
and what is at stake in taking one route to achieve that end rather than another 
(Connelly et al, 2009).  The academy knowledge builds in precisely this way. 
 
By contrast, policy-makers may be little interested in why x works.  Rather they will 
use the available evidence base to decide which course of action to pursue now.  One 
answer can substitute for another, or be rescinded later, depending upon the interests 
of those concerned (Earl et al, 2003).  There is no single route that has been 
consistently followed.  Thus in various parts of the world literacy policy content has 
included mandatory phonics first approaches, as in California; structured literacy 
teaching programmes like Success for All, adopted at one point in New York City;  
supplementary programmes tailored quite specifically to struggling readers such as 
Reading Recovery; or developmental and assessment-based programmes for literacy 
teachers such as First Steps, developed in-house in Western Australia and later sold 
on to other settings.   The robustness of the decision to select x versus y is not so 
much assured in advance as tested by what happens next.  The way performance 
indicators shift post the point of knowledge transfer becomes the crucial marker of 
policy success or failure and the key means of knowing after the policy has been put 
in place what really works.  For New Labour this reliance on public performance 
indicators generated some of the most important challenges they were to face over the 
policy cycle. 
 
Target-setting as a means of managing policy   
If policy-makers rely on the transfer of existing knowledge from one place to another 
as the main mechanism for improving system performance, then another key policy 
ingredient is ensuring that the available knowledge is properly used so that the desired 
outcomes can be achieved.  This often means setting performance targets which 
children, teachers and schools are expected to reach.  In their account of the 
development of NLS, Stannard and Huxford (2007), two of the Strategy‟s chief 
architects, describe the original 80 per cent target introduced with the Strategy as “an 
intelligent and evidence-based expectation which challenged and supported schools to 
arrive at a sustainable level of improvement.”. In this sense, the target is designed as a 
spur to action, rather than being an assured outcome.  Holding individual schools to 
account for the progress they make towards the target becomes an important means of 
keeping everyone on board for the job of implementing policy.  
 
Later in the policy cycle the government would raise this target to 85% of children 
gaining Level 4 and use analysis of the performance data to argue the political 
necessity of so doing in these terms: 
 
Achieving Level 4 at the end of primary school improves a child‟s prospects at 
secondary school and their future life chances.  70 per cent of pupils who 
achieve Level 4 at Key Stage 2 go on to get five or more GCSEs at grades A*-
C.  Of those who did not achieve Level 4 in 1997, just 12 per cent achieved five 
GCSEs at grades A*-C last summer.  (DfES, 2003, quoted in Stannard and 
Huxford, 2007) 
 
Later still, this higher target would be diluted to an aspiration that government would 
continue to hold, but which individual schools would no longer be required to meet.  
Such adjustments reflect the profile of the Strategy in public discourse.  Commenting 
on the revised target of 85%, Stannard and Huxford say “From a moral standpoint, the 
new target was justified, and it was politically difficult to respond to the criticism that 
20 per cent or even 15 percent of children may not be expected to reach the 
standard.”.  This last point highlights how such publicly-declared targets link to and 
help manage public expectations about what the education service ought to deliver.   
Expectations have changed.   Thirty years ago the outcomes of the education system 
in the UK were predicated on a differential distribution of capabilities and 
achievements with the main examination at 16 geared to success for 30% of the 
cohort.  This was compatible with the then desired goal of producing a relatively 
small educational elite who would continue on to further qualifications.  Similar 
results now would be regarded as less than satisfactory and indeed secondary schools 
in the UK are consistently exhorted to do better. 
 
Policy-maker‟s extensive use of performance indicators and their prominence in 
political debate speak to the specific domain they occupy and the different 
responsibilities that come with that terrain, including public accountability.  The 
decisions that policy-makers take are in that sense calculated risks.  Successful policy-
making means making the right decisions at the right time, and continuing to do so 
over the policy cycle as events unfurl on the ground.  The analysis of the National 
Literacy Strategy in this paper focuses precisely on the political challenges that 
policy-makers in England faced over the policy cycle and how these helped shape 
what they have learnt from the process of undertaking the reform. 
 
Managing policy adaptation over the longer term: trajectories and cycles 
In a review of a variety of large-scale reform programmes and their potential 
sustainability, Earl et al (2003, p11) comment, “It is quite clear from the trajectory of 
these reforms that nothing is stable and that any reform will evolve and adapt as a 
result of the context and conditions that surround it.”   They highlight how difficult it 
is to steer reforms towards a successful conclusion over the policy cycle.  
 
Policy sociology uses the concept of the policy cycle to draw attention to the ways in 
which policy develops over time and across a range of contexts, involving different 
actors whose intentions and purposes may vary (Bowe, Ball and Gold, 1992; Moss 
and Huxford, 2007; Taylor, 1997).  The assumption is that policies will inevitably be 
re-shaped through social interaction as they move from one context to another.  By 
focusing on policy change in the particular local contexts in which policy is enacted, 
analysis highlights the space for individual agency and acts as a corrective to top-
down formulations of policy delivery which presume that the intentions of policy-
makers, represented through policy content, will remain intact regardless of context 
and always could and therefore should translate into faithful implementation.   
 
Like policy sociology, research on school effectiveness and improvement also 
presumes that policy is subject to adaptation.  Yet whereas policy sociologists analyse 
local adaptations in order to study the relationship between macro and micro 
structural effects, researchers working from a school improvement and effectiveness 
perspective focus on adaptations at the local level in order to improve policy design 
and implementation.  By formulating principled understandings of how this stage in 
the policy cycle can be positively managed, these researchers argue that outcomes can 
be enhanced rather than diminished (Earl et al, 2003; Datnow et al, 2002; Fullan, 
1993).  Fullan, for instance, highlights the importance of fostering local ownership of 
policy and argues that investing in local communities of practice is a key ingredient in 
taking policies forward.  Earl et al argue that strong central control at the start of the 
policy cycle needs to give way to greater local autonomy later on. They also caution 
that too much adaptation may lead to a loss of policy coherence and identity, but too 
much control will prevent the necessary development. These various ideas encourage 
continued investment in a policy‟s success over the medium to long-term.  They have 
also made the on-going management of policy part of the political agenda.  In 
England, policy features embedded in NLS that enable this kind of hands-on 
management of the policy from within the political domain include: fast feedback 
loops that enable the centre to monitor progress at local level as the policy unfolds; 
decision-making cycles which encourage adjustment and further innovation; sufficient 
resources to sustain investment; and an infrastructure which retains control over the 
direction of policy at the local level (Moss, 2004; Earl et al, 2003).   
 
As policymakers‟ ambitions for the scale and duration of reform have expanded, so 
too the management of reform programmes has become increasingly complex.   The 
very scale of current attempts at education system reform means that policies seldom 
come singly (Ball, 2008).  As policies have diversified and multiplied so it becomes 
harder to track the development of any one policy in isolation.  Rather for the 
purposes of this paper the policy cycle can be thought of as the changing relations 
between the various factors which influence policy development over time and across 
contexts (Howard, 2005).   
 
Analysing NLS in context: one strand in a patchwork of education reform 
There are political risks to undertaking large scale education reform.  Early 
confidence in the enterprise rests on the assumption that the system can do better and 
that this does not require new knowledge so much as more efficient systems for 
management and delivery of what is already known.  Analysis of system-wide 
performance data undertaken by the school improvement and effectiveness movement 
support this view.  They point to evidence of good practice in the current system and 
maintain that if it is already possible somewhere, then it can be replicated in other 
settings.  Thus Michael Barber, one of the lead policy-makers responsible for rolling 
out the NLS at national scale in England, identified targets of achievement for English 
schools by drawing on comparative analysis of literacy attainment in other countries.   
 
“Our assumption, based on a review of the international research, is that about 
80 per cent of children will achieve those standards simply as a result of being 
taught well by teachers who know, understand and are able to use proven best 
practice. A further 15 per cent have a good chance of meeting the standards if, 
in addition, they receive extra small-group tuition should they fall behind their 
peers. The remaining five per cent are likely to need one-to-one tuition from 
time to time, preferably early in their school careers (ie before age eight). Some 
of these will prove able to meet the standards: for a very small percentage we do 
not yet have the knowledge or the capacity to enable them to meet the standards 
but, for sure, we won‟t give up trying.” Barber, 2000 
 
The content of the literacy curriculum and the specification for its delivery defined 
within NLS are in many respects just such an amalgam of “proven best practice” 
(Beard, 1999).  From this point of view NLS could be thought of as a sustained course 
of professional development for teachers, imparting core skills in teaching reading 
and writing which would bring all teachers up to the level of the best.  At the same 
time the management tools embedded within the design allowed for close monitoring 
of progress towards the expected performance targets so that potential problems in 
implementation could be identified and addressed.  Policymakers were therefore able 
to continue to adjust policy as it rolled out.  Indeed, this flexibility in its design has 
been one of the defining characteristics of NLS.  Through its combination of different 
approaches to teaching reading and writing and its refusal to align with any single 
paradigm or a more narrowly focused approach policy makers were able to continue 
to pick and mix from across that range as the policy developed (Moss, 2004).  Earl et 
al (2003) described NLS as a particularly successful example of a policy that could 
adapt without losing its integrity.  Yet now 10 years on the capacity of the policy to 
deliver large-scale reform of the kind originally envisaged has been severely tested.  
Not least because, despite the confident predictions, the policy has never fully 
succeeded in meeting the performance targets that were set.   
 
Initial analysis of the NLS was much more optimistic.  Analysis of performance 
outcomes for the cohort exposed to the smaller scale intervention, the National 
Literacy Project that had acted as an immediate precursor to NLS, showed statistically 
significant gains (Machin and McNally, 2004).  Confidence in the efficacy of the 
policy seemed borne out by the early performance data which showed a steady rise.  
In 2000, on the basis of the available evidence, Barber was able to confidently predict 
that the target would be met by 2002.  Even when it first became clear that that 
momentum was becoming harder to sustain it was not an immediate problem.  The 
Strategy was well protected through strong political patronage – as a high profile 
flagship initiative directly endorsed by the then secretary of state it was too important 
to abandon.  Even when some of the key personnel moved on within government, the 
central policy team still seemed well placed to steer the policy on.  Indeed as a by-
product of being contracted out from the civil service to the not-for-profit company, 
CfBT, they were assured continuity in management and support for the policy over 
the contract‟s length.  With more new things still to do in terms of strengthening the 
policy, the team were still confident that the target would be reached.  New data came 
on board that seemed to justify the optimism (PISA. 2003) whilst a re-structuring of 
the policy into a Primary National Strategy (PNS) promised to harmonise various 
potentially competing initiatives within the primary sector under one management 
structure, offering greater policy coherence. Yet despite these efforts the performance 
data continued to plateau.   
 
The interviews that form the main empirical data for this paper were conducted at a 
point (2004/5) in the policy cycle when the NLS, now nesting within the PNS found 
itself under increasing pressure. Although the policy itself still acted as the main 
mechanism for improving pupil performance in literacy a re-tendering process had 
seen the responsibility for policy-delivery transferred over to Capita, a private sector 
firm with a variety of diverse interests in public sector work, by no means all in 
education. A significant number of the original policy team chose to move on to other 
employment rather than transfer to Capita.  Not so long after, a particular combination 
of events in the policy cycle led to the then Secretary of State for Education calling 
for a review of the teaching of reading in the early years.  In effect, decisions over 
what should happen next in this key arena of literacy policy were taken out of the 
hands of the NLS management team.  This was the first time they had lost control 
over the political agenda since the programme‟s inception (Moss, 2007; Rose, 2005).  
The outcome of the review led to the introduction of a phonics first programme to the 
early years classes in primary schools (Rose, 2006).  Although much of the NLS 
curriculum framework and the policy infrastructure survive at the time of writing, 
along with the original targets, the NLS as an organisation no longer holds the central 
position in reforming primary education that it once did.   
 
The immediate combination of events that produced this outcome included: 
favourable press coverage of a phonics first programme that had run in one area of 
Scotland (Ellis, 2007); the opportunity for an opposition MP to select the subject of 
inquiry for the parliamentary select committee in education; and his choice of the 
Teaching Children to Read as the topic.  But this combination of events gained its 
political significance because of its timing within the longer policy cycle (Moss, 
2007).  Over the policy cycle, where once the annual publication of results from 
standard attainments tests in literacy confirmed the success of the policy in raising 
standards, now they began to highlight the Strategy‟s failure to deliver.  Headlines 
such as Primary schools miss test targets and Fall in primary writing standards 
demonstrate this all too publicly.  NLS could be failed on two counts:  the fact that 
neither the original nor the revised targets the government set for pupil performance at 
Key Stage 1 and 2 had yet been fully met (though see Stannard and Huxford (2007) 
for a fuller discussion on this issue.); and the fact that the rate of increase in 
performance had stalled (The fastest increase in performance was in the first three 
years of the Strategy).  These facts run counter to two founding suppositions 
underlying public sector reform – that given good management and the correct input it 
is possible to have uniform quality in whatever field; and that education is no different 
in this respect and indeed urgently needs to achieve this end.  The success of the 
Strategy in raising attainment to the levels that it had had been overtaken in public 
perception by its perceived failings.  As a flagship programme of public sector reform 
this perception has the potential to bring into question the government‟s ability to 
manage well and deliver what it promised to the electorate.  Of course, the extent to 
which this perception gathers speed depends on what else is happening to similar 
targets and expectations in other areas of public sector reform. 
 
Taking sides in debate over NLS 
The interviews that form the basis of this analysis were conducted at a point in the 
policy cycle when the Strategy‟s comparative failings were beginning to outweigh its 
comparative successes in public discourse.  Interviewees included policy-makers in a 
range of government departments and agencies.   Some of them had had direct 
responsibility for literacy policy within NLS, whilst others worked for what might be 
regarded as competitor organisations within government, agencies that held different 
responsibilities and from those vantage points had the potential to offer alternative 
forms of advice over how literacy policy should develop.  Interviewees also included  
members of the research community with interests in literacy and/or education policy.  
Some of these had been consulted over the NLS and its implementation, some were 
neutral bystanders, others were keen critics of the policy.  Finally, some of those 
within policy or practitioner communities who had most directly advocated the 
adoption of a phonics first programme, both at the point when the NLS was adopted 
and at later points in the policy cycle, were also interviewed.  Whilst in retrospect 
these interviews happened at a key tipping point in the policy‟s development, at the 
time that was not immediately obvious. Interviews invited respondents to identify and 
reflect on key policy documents and their evolution; and to consider the ideal and 
actual relationship between policy and research in the light of their experience.   
 
Interviewees talked about the NLS in very different terms.  This in part depended on 
their position within either policy or academic networks and their involvement in the 
design of NLS.  These seemed to influence how they read the documentation that 
constituted the policy, both the originals that launched it (The National Framework 
document (DfEE, 1998) including the Literacy Hour, and the searchlights model); and 
the successor documents that have accrued as the policy has developed (Grammar for 
Writing (DfEE, 2000); Excellence and Enjoyment (DfES, 2003); Watching and 
Learning 3 (Earl et al, 2002).  Some described the NLS as a means of managing 
educational reform and would sum up its distinctiveness using phrases such as  
“Standards and accountability.”; or “Support in relation to need.”  These expressions 
most commonly occurred in interviews with policy makers with a background in 
school effectiveness and improvement.  Others described NLS as a means of raising 
pupil standards through improving teacher quality, or as a new form of literacy 
pedagogy.  Those who were particularly critical talked about it as an illegitimate 
intervention, an unwarranted experiment, lacking in sufficient evidence or theoretical 
justification to justify its imposition. 
 
Interviewees often reflected on the relative success or failure of the NLS.  As one 
might expect, those who spoke of comparative failure were not those who had 
exercised most control over literacy policy, or at least they had not exercised most 
control over its development at what they perceived to be its key points.  (Some 
policy makers linked their perception of policy failure to losing key battles for 
influence early on.)  By contrast, those who had exercised most direct control over the 
policy from within NLS spoke about it differently. Although they recognised that the 
policy had not delivered everything they might once have hoped, they did see it as 
successful, transformative, unique in its influence, and with the capacity to have a 
substantial impact both on education and policy-making generally as well as on 
individual schools.  Some spoke of this as an achievement in the past rather than 
currently, though their concerns were less with the progress made than the directions 
that the policy was now being taken in.   
 
Lessons from the NLS: Competing explanations for comparative failure 
Those who focused in on NLS‟ comparative failures explained its lack of success in 
the following terms: 
 
 That it had followed the wrong recipe – either for literacy pedagogy or for 
managing change 
 That there were too little good quality data or too many gaps in the available 
knowledge/expertise to meet the immediate demands (This argument was 
most likely to be made by policy makers.)   
 The difficulty of exerting influence –the right people had not got into the right 
place at the right time 
 The exigencies of the political process - events in the political sphere 
distracted attention or distorted actions 
 These kinds of complaints leave intact the political expectation that more could have 
been done, if only xyz had happened.  They presuppose that there is a right recipe, 
that it could have been taken up but that, for whatever reason, the evidence for it had 
been overlooked or even wilfully ignored.  Yet it is also possible to draw a different 
conclusion.  Would anyone else really have managed to do any better?  Could the 
appropriate gaps in knowledge or expertise have been fully identified in advance? Do 
we indeed yet accurately know what they are?   Are the comparative successes or 
failures of the policy really to do with the particular route followed?  Or has NLS 
helped establish that large scale system improvement is inevitably an imperfect 
process?   
 
Look again at the standardised test results and in many respects NLS‟s achievements 
mirror those achieved elsewhere, whatever the particular approach adopted.  Linn 
(2000)  in a review of a large number of reform programmes in the USA 
demonstrated that regardless of their approach, each of them pretty much delivered 
what the NLS achieved, in pretty much the same time frame.  After early gains, they 
also stalled at roughly the same level of performance.   Under these circumstances it 
would be foolish to imagine that there is a magic bullet waiting out there, a foolproof 
set of conditions, or pedagogic method, a crucial missing element which could bring 
things round the corner to match expectations of uniformly high performance.   
 
This paper is dismissing the wrong recipe charge.  This is not the same as saying that 
some things could not have been done better.  My own personal list includes:  either 
not starting with or withdrawing much more quickly the official planning sheet that 
had accompanied the Strategy‟s dissemination to schools and which committed 
teachers to organising a five day sequence of tasks, differentiated according to ability 
and each designed to be completed in the 20 minute section of the hour committed to 
independent work;   encouraging writing tasks that could be undertaken at children‟s 
own speed over the length of the week, with free reading time provided for those who 
finished early (Moss, 2004); and allowing schools to identify locally where there were 
gaps in their provision which needed strengthening, rather than mandating “system 
patches” from the centre that everyone was expected to follow.  But hindsight is a 
wonderful thing. Moreover there is no certainty that any of these would have made 
the crucial difference to how the programme as a whole performed.   Rather than 
subscribe to the “if only” myth about the Strategy, this paper turns now to other more 
important issues that require attention and which surface more clearly in the insiders‟ 
tales of success. 
 
Lessons from the NLS:  Policy in its political context 
Those most directly involved in NLS were more likely to account for its success in 
terms of a series of challenges that had been met and resolved.  Although they were of 
course keen to defend the recipe they had applied, whether in terms of pedagogic 
repertoire or transformational process, they also focused much more closely on the 
policy‟s evolution, and why and how it had changed.  One of the hallmarks of the 
Strategy insider was the way in which they described the process as “learning as you 
go”.  This conception of policymaking appears in the public vocabulary of Michael 
Barber, one of the policy‟s chief architects, who often characterised NLS as “the 
learning strategy” and used similar phrases to distinguish his own approach to 
implementing reform (Barber, 1996).  From this perspective, the certainty in the 
system that gave politicians the confidence to back its implementation at national 
level was the certainty that the Strategy management team had the capacity to rise to 
the challenge of any problems they might face and devise appropriate solutions. This 
is policy-making as serial problem solving, an approach outlined by Barber in the 
book he later wrote about his role at the heart of government after he had moved on 
from directly managing reform in education (Barber, 2007a).  In interviewees‟ 
accounts, the success of the policy depended at least as much on this capacity for 
problem-solving as on having started in the right place.  
 
The kinds of problems that were identified and addressed within NLS are represented 
in the list of supplementary materials and initiatives that have gone into schools since 
the original policy launch (See for instance, Stannard and Huxford, 2007, pp 134; 
and153-4).  These in part reflect the kind of programme adjustments that Datnow et al 
(2002) refer to as “building the plane while it‟s flying”, and which they argue are 
hallmarks of good programme design.  For Datnow et al., these kinds of adjustments 
are not a sign of lack of foresight on behalf of programme designers but of their 
receptiveness to the specific needs of the contexts in which programmes unfold, 
revealed by monitoring data post programme implementation.   Some of the 
adaptations within NLS clearly fall within this category.  For instance, phonics was 
one of the first areas where the team realised that additional support would be 
required to ensure high quality teaching in the early years.  The PiPs materials were 
designed to meet this need (See also Moss and Huxford, 2007).  This kind of 
adjustment is driven by feedback from implementation at the classroom level.  But 
initiatives could also derive from changes in the political sphere.  Excellence and 
Enjoyment, a government position document which gave a new steer to the direction 
and management of literacy policy in the primary school is closely associated with the 
arrival of Charles Clarke as Secretary of State for Education (DfES, 2003).  At a key 
point in the policy cycle he backed adjusting the policy in this particular direction, 
when other choices might have been made. 
  
Ministers build their reputations by having new programmes to announce which can 
demonstrate that they are driving forward the process of reform.  To stand still is not 
really an option.  One ex secretary of state for education, interviewed for this 
research, commented: 
 
[The Department] is asked to take initiatives because government gets 
criticized if it looks as though it‟s running out of steam, and it is true that the 
big issues like education get turned to by the prime minister‟s office if they 
need initiatives. And it is difficult to say please go away we‟ve had enough 
initiatives to last us a life time. …..  I was mindful and I presume my 
successors are mindful, that you can‟t win on this, if you allow bedding down 
to take place, it looks as though you‟ve run out of steam and you‟re not a very 
effective secretary of state and minister of team, and nobody wants to be 
remembered for that. 
 
There are constraints as well as opportunities which run with the high level of 
political support that the NLS garnered.  Part of what interviewees described were the 
changes in the political context that led to different policy outcomes.  These reflected 
issues that went well beyond the question of how well NLS was bedding down 
through classroom implementation.   
 In their public reflections on the Strategy both Stannard and Huxford (2007) and 
Barber (2006) draw attention to this changing landscape.  Stannard and Huxford 
(2007) divide the evolution of NLS into three different periods, each characterised by 
different levels of political support and different relations between key players within 
the policy domain.  They call these: Policy implementation, 1997/8; securing the 
strategy, 1999-2001; and devolving the strategy, 2002 – 2007.  Barber interviewed 
in 2006 (Mead, 2006) was less precise on how the time periods divide and also used a 
different terminology to sum up each phase:  standards and accountability, 1997 to 
1999; collaboration and capacity-building (he gave no precise timings for this 
phase); and market-based or quasi-market reform, 2001-5.  He listed under the 
heading, collaboration and capacity-building, items that fall beyond the policy 
remit of the NLS, including “improving teachers' pay, creating opportunities for 
schools to collaborate, … building capacity in the system”.  By contrast, Stannard and 
Huxford‟s description of NLS‟s policy trajectory follows the normative sequence that 
the school improvement and effectiveness movement would advocate: from a highly 
prescriptive and centralised phase of policy implementation, when fidelity is key, to a 
looser relationship between centre and periphery able to sustain “the ideal of 
autonomous schools” (Stannard and Huxford, 2007, p142).  They also question 
whether the final move in the sequence was wise, or simply resulted in a loss of focus 
on core literacy skills in the classroom at a point in the process of implementation 
when this was still necessary.  Perhaps this is their version of “if only ….”. 
 
Michael Barber‟s delineation of the third stage as “quasi-market reform” and the 
longer time period given to this stage indicate a different set of reference points. 
 
“Between 2001 and 2005 what Blair increasingly hankered after was a way of 
improving the education system that didn't need to be constantly driven by 
government. He wanted to develop self-sustaining, self-improving systems, and 
that led him to look into how to change not just the standards and the quality of 
teaching, but the structures and incentives. Essentially it's about creating 
different forms of a quasi-market in public services, exploiting the power of 
choice, competition, transparency and incentives, and that's really where the 
education debate is going now.” (in Mead, 2006) 
 
This maps onto a wider analysis of the trajectory of public sector reform undertaken 
within government and published as a discussion document by the Prime Minister‟s 
Strategy Unit in 2006 (Piatt et al, 2006).  This was intended as a major stock-taking 
exercise amongst policymakers at the start of New Labour‟s third term.  In part the 
document demonstrates the government‟s disenchantment with top-down 
performance management, their initial tool of choice for achieving system reform: 
  
“though it will have a continuing role, reliance on these top down pressures 
alone to drive public service improvements may now have largely run its 
course.  … [They] have therefore increasingly been complemented by 
horizontal drivers (of competition and contestability), [and] bottom up drivers 
(of user choice and voice)” (Piatt et al, 2006) 
 
The new mix of policy levers the document called for were reflected in some of the 
key decisions Tony Blair took in relation to education before he stepped down as 
prime minister, including finding a larger role for the private sector.  The evidence 
base that policymakers are reflecting on here is not detailed observation of the 
classroom and the quality of teaching and learning that followed from the introduction 
of the National Literacy Strategy, though NLS was certainly referenced in the 
document, as was the decision to change to a phonics first approach in the early years 
(See Moss, 2007).  Rather they are broad brush judgements about how well public 
service reforms are seen to be doing, linked to the political need to meet the rising 
expectations of an increasingly informed and sceptical public.  The political problem 
was described in these terms: 
 
“as real incomes have grown, so people‟s expectations of public services have 
risen. People are accustomed to much greater choice and control over their 
lives. Higher educational standards mean they are better equipped to exercise 
choice, less likely to accept government advice without question and less likely 
to allow others to make choices on their behalf.”  (Piatt et al, 2006)  
 
In essence this document shows policymakers knowledge-building through reflecting 
on the job they have done, where it has gone well and where it has proved more 
difficult to claim success.  By 2007 and the other side of his involvement with this 
review, Barber had revised the analysis he gave in interview in 2006, extending the 
scope of his argument to large scale public service reform in any national context.  He 
now identifies three contrasting paradigms for reform which he describes as:  
“Command and Control• Devolution and Transparency• Quasi-markets•” 
 
“The three paradigms provide a toolkit for governments to recognize how to 
reform and when, and what each choice requires of them and their 
organizations.”  (Barber, 2007b) 
 
These are the basic methods that policymakers can choose between, and he describes 
their attendant risks and dangers as well as possible rewards.  The paper is designed to 
guide decision-making at this level.  The three paradigms are not inevitable stages in a 
necessary sequence in which one must always follow after another, rather each gains 
its strength from being applied under the appropriate conditions.  The policymakers‟ 
skill lies in selecting the right tool at the appropriate time.  All options remain on the 
table and can be combined in various ways. There is not a single recipe. 
 
“the acute reality is that the need to transform the way governments work 
requires experimentation. The imperative to deliver better services at an 
affordable cost can no longer be ignored.” (Ibid) 
 
Escaping the policymaker’s domain:  looking at the logic of implementation from 
the context of policy implementation 
Part of what has happened over New Labour‟s term of office is that the business of 
policymaking and good governance has become highly visible and open to transparent 
theorisation on the part of those involved.  This is a global phenomenon.  Much of this 
guidance on policymaking is now publicly accessible via the web.  Whether in the UK 
on government websites; or via multi-national organisations such as the OECD, or via 
private sector organisations who sell advice to governments engaged in the process of 
reform, such as McKinsey‟s, it is possible to find and track the migration of ideas 
about what constitutes good governance and public sector reform and how it can best 
be achieved.  Yet this is indeed “steering at a distance” (Kickert, 2005)  The voices 
drawn on in this discussion are those who have been most closely involved in 
decision-making within government and who act at some distance from the services 
they manage.  The experience of those involved at the front line are striking in their 
absence.  No more so than in the PMSU document where the elegant model 
representing “dimensions of a self-improving system for schools”  (Chart 4.2,  Piatt et 
al, 2006) denotes the workforce as simply on the receiving end of a variety of external 
pressures that can be used to drive change:  top down performance management of 
schools; market incentives to increase efficiency and quality of service; parents and 
pupils shaping schools; and capability and capacity.  The last comes in a poor fourth 
and consists of a list of potential inputs, rather than the knowledge of reform that the 
workforce might now be able to muster. 
 
National reform programmes driven from the centre, as in the UK, are bound to create 
these kinds of distances and dislocations.  From many policymakers‟ point of view 
change simply would not happen without them.  Indeed, they argue that change in the 
USA has been notoriously harder to engineer precisely because of the very different 
relations between players built into the federal and district governance structures and 
the difficulty of therefore exerting the same amount of pressure or control (Barber, 
2008).   These distances and dislocations have of course not gone unremarked by 
those who find themselves “locked out” of the discussion in one way or another.  But 
they do not lead to the same kind of theorisation.   For instance, the ins and outs of the 
political process often became part of the subject matter discussed in interviews with 
those who had had any involvement with policy.  But in the case of almost all of the 
academics, these kinds of details were presented as anecdotes rather than as 
substantive issues in their own right.  They explained on a personal level how trying it 
was to get involved, or indeed why the particular interviewee had given up and 
backed off.  Such stories were regarded as in large part peripheral to the subject of the 
interview as a whole and were not directly transformed into a means of analysing or 
theorising policy implementation or enactment.  Interviewees‟ investments in the 
particular area of knowledge they counted as their own – linguistics or psychological 
or socio-cultural approaches to literacy – precluded such analysis. 
  
There is a real need to bring the larger scale shifts and flows in political thinking back 
into analysis of policy implementation at the local level  (Ball, 2008).  This can be 
done by tracking their tangled relationship over the policy cycle.  This means taking a 
longer time frame and a broader canvas than can be mapped by following a single 
trajectory of one part of the policy.  Yet it is possible to read the traces of the bigger 
shifts in policy thinking in the smaller picture of literacy policy as it was recalled by 
my interviewees.   In the stories told about the policy landscape,  three distinct periods 
in literacy policy emerge,  each of which end with a policy document that changes the 
direction of policy travel.  These periods are: 
 
 Phase 1 –  Inception    (1996/8)  This phase encompasses the publication of 
Michael Barber‟s The Learning Game, his first blueprint for education system 
reform;  the point at which the National Literacy Project (NLP) was 
commissioned by the then Conservative Secretary of  State for Education; 
New Labour‟s adoption of NLP as the cornerstone of its reform programme 
for schools; their election to power and the scaling up of NLP to the NLS; and  
the first year in which NLS rolled into schools.  At the time, Barber summed 
up this approach to reform as:“Standards, accountability, and support”  
(Barber, 1996).  He also described this phase as “informed prescription” 
(Barber, 2002) and it provides an example of what he would later still term 
“Command and control”.    The key policy document was The NLS: 
Framework for Teaching. (DfEE, 1998) 
 Phase 2 -   Implementation  and adaptation I  (1998/2003)  This phase 
encompasses the development of the policy over its first five years; the first 
turnover in Ministers in the Education Department; a change in key personnel 
and the NLS move to CfBT; the first signs of the plateau and the first attempts 
to address this; the move from NLS to PNS.  Barber in 2006 recalls this phase 
in the policy cycle as “Collaboration and capacity building”, thus signalling a 
move away from top-down performance management.  This phase culminated 
in the publication of Excellence and Enjoyment: A Strategy for Primary 
Schools.  (DfES, 2003) 
 Phase 3 -   Implementation  and adaptation II    (2004/6)  This phase 
encompasses the increasing marginalisation of NLS within education policy as 
it is superseded by other policy initiatives; moves on to being managed by 
Capita; and gives way to the Rose Review.  Barber described this phase in the 
policy cycle as “Quasi markets” (Barber, 2006).  This phase culminated in the 
publication of the Independent review of the teaching of early reading. Final 
Report. (Rose, 2006) 
 
This brings into the frame the various factors which contributed to the confidence 
with which the NLS began and the conditions which weakened it as recalled by 
interviewees. 
 
Phase 1.  Part of the success here is told in terms of the decisive intervention in 
literacy policy made by New Labour in 1997.  In effect, by making both literacy and 
numeracy policies central to their electoral platform they trounce Tory plans to let 
state education whither on the vine.  Part of New Labour‟s success is in seizing the 
initiative back from Ofsted, who under Woodhead‟s leadership were creating all kinds 
of trouble for government by finger-pointing at perceived failures in education rather 
than trying to fix them. Adopting a National Literacy Strategy stands as bold and 
decisive political action.  It hits all the right buttons for a Labour government  – 
winning back support for public services on the grounds that they can deliver on 
quality; with most support going to those communities with fewest resources and 
highest needs; and promising equality of outcome. The decision to go country-wide at 
that point, to get into the business of large-scale education reform, is vindicated by the 
early successes; early evaluations; and the amount those in charge of the Strategy 
learn, the resource and energy they put into problem-solving the difficulties that arose, 
and tackling them.  At this point nothing disrupts that certainty. 
 
Phase 2. This sees the movement from the success of capturing the policy space to the 
process of rolling out the programme country wide.  This inevitably leads on to a 
variety of unexpected problems of implementation, their recognition and solution 
building. (In Rumsfeld talk this would mean dealing with “the known unknowns”.)  
Success in dealing with problems as they emerge reinforces the importance of 
committing to “learning as you go”, building intelligent systems of plan, act, revise, 
review; and having the resources to tackle the unforeseen. This phase also sees the 
limits to what can be driven from the centre beginning to surface and the emergence 
of the dilemmas associated with “tight v loose” control over programme design.  
Whilst in the early days the Strategy was assured of strong political support, 
vindicated by early gains in results, as the plateau emerges the political wind begins to 
change.  The fact that the Strategy is being conducted on a very public stage matters 
at this point.  As time goes on, and ministers move in and out of the Education 
Department, the Strategy begins to experience the limits of patronage.  There is the 
loss of key personnel; the difficulty of keeping going when the Strategy itself is no 
longer centre stage and when schools being asked to do other things too.  During this 
period this change in conditions is expressed in the morph of the NLS into the 
Primary National Strategy (PNS).  The changes to the policy‟s fortunes take place 
within this broader political context, which itself is generating yet more policy in 
education – Every Child Matters, (HM Treasury, 2003) to name but one other strand. 
 
Phase 3.  As the plateau continues, Government itself begins to adjust to the risks 
associated with command and control.  The PMSU document (Piatt et al, 2006) 
signals this.  This adjustment leads to new ways of abnegating more responsibility to 
others, so that government no longer carries the can for the limits in service 
improvement.  This includes advocating more use of the private sector and greater use 
of contractual responsibilities, so if the contractor can‟t meet the target they lose the 
contract or incur penalties.  Ministers begin to speak of acting as purchasers not 
providers in policy reform.  In this environment support for the NLS itself weakens. 
Ministers no longer want to so firmly embrace something which promises uncertain 
future returns (This is told as a loss of interest/ personnel/ and or direct lines of 
support.).  All of this shows dramatically in the response to The Select Committee 
review of early reading and the sequence of events which lead to the introduction of 
phonics first programmes in the early years of literacy teaching via the Rose Review.  
This revision to the programme gains no support from the processes of internal policy 
data monitoring and review, as staff from both Ofsted and NLS make clear in their 
submissions to the inquiry.   Increasingly the story of the fortunes of the NLS 
becomes a story about politics - not pedagogy or methodologies for teaching literacy 
or methodologies for engineering organisational change. 
 
The stories told by those most directly involved in trying to make the NLS work are 
as much about the difficulties of managing up as of managing down.  The longer the 
policy cycle dragged on, the more difficult it became to influence thinking above, and 
the less easy it became to gain the space to do what might be required further down.  
There is no clear or untrammelled space in which to act. 
 
Closing the political gap 
For better or worse the political context for such a programme of large scale education 
reform cannot be written out of the story.  You only get to attempt this kind of 
endeavour with political backing. But political backing comes at a price.  The 
chronology matters as it highlights important aspects of the political context for 
reform, and the changing terrain that any approach would have to grapple with.  It 
also moves debate on from “if only” thinking – if only this, that or the other hadn‟t 
got in the way.  To achieve substantially different outcomes, the academy needs to 
know what the price of political involvement is both in the English context and 
elsewhere.  We are not clear enough on that at the moment, precisely because the 
focus always seems to rest on the policy itself and its internal structures or content, 
and not on the political environment it operates within.  
 There is a difference between research conducted within the confines of the academy 
or professional practice and policy acted out in the public domain.  As the business of 
fixing literacy moves onto the public stage it meets new constraints.  What lessons 
can we draw for large-scale reform by writing the political difficulties the strategy got 
into back into the account?  Here are some I would put forward: 
 
 Standardisation of delivery round any one single method yields the pattern of 
results seen in the NLS 
 The mantra “pressure and support” works if there are clear and self-evident 
answers to well-specified problems.  But what seems most relevant at the 
centre may not match what is required in particular local contexts. 
 Effective top-down performance management is time-limited and should 
incorporate clear handover and exit strategies. Responsibility for determining 
the balance between change and continuity needs to be shared more equally 
between professionals and other stakeholders. 
 There are real and substantial distorting effects from tying professional 
practice too closely into the interests of the political sphere  
 Successive policy innovation on short timescales leads to increasingly 
idiosyncratic policy choices at the centre and minimises the chances of 
meaningful reform.  
 
We seem to have reached a point in the policy cycle when policymakers increasingly 
seek to disengage themselves from the disappointments that come from pursuing 
large-scale education reform by passing the responsibilities they once took to 
themselves over to the private sector or looking to maintain momentum by shopping 
around for yet more new ideas. This keeps the pace of reform unchanged at a time 
when we really need more close-focused and settled scrutiny of the particular 
challenges that local settings face.   
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